



Smithsonian Institution  
Office of the Inspector General

# SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

October 1, 2015 – March 31, 2016



**Table 1: Semiannual Reporting Requirements of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended**

IG Act Reference	Reporting Requirement	Pages
Section 4(a)(2)	Review of legislation and regulations	13
Section 5(a)(1)	Significant problems, abuses and deficiencies	None
Section 5(a)(2)	Significant recommendations for corrective action	None
Section 5(a)(3)	Reports with corrective action not completed	11
Section 5(a)(4)	Matters referred to prosecutive authorities	13
Section 5(a)(5)	Information or assistance refused	None
Section 5(a)(6)	List of reports issued	4
Section 5(a)(7)	Summaries of significant reports	4
Section 5(a)(8)	Audit, inspection and evaluation reports—questioned costs	None
Section 5(a)(9)	Audit, inspection and evaluation reports—funds to be put to better use	10
Section 5(a)(10)	Prior audit, inspection and evaluation reports unresolved	None
Section 5(a)(11)	Significant revised management decisions	None
Section 5(a)(12)	Significant management decisions with which OIG disagreed	None
Section 5(a)(14-16)	Peer reviews conducted	11

Cover photo: Saucer magnolia tree blossoms in the Enid A. Haupt Garden near the south entrance to the Smithsonian Institution Building ("The Castle") in Washington, D.C. Photo: Eric Long, Smithsonian Institution.

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## Abbreviations

CIO	Chief Information Officer
CLA	CliftonLarsonAllen LLP
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Crowe	Crowe Horwath LLP
FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
KPMG	KPMG LLP
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PCI DSS	Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
SInet	Smithsonian's corporate network
Smithsonian	Smithsonian Institution



## Message from the Inspector General

On behalf of the Smithsonian Institution's Office of the Inspector General, I am pleased to submit this semiannual report. This report highlights the audit and investigative activities of our office for the 6-month period ending March 31, 2016.

Throughout this semiannual period, our audit work addressed issues intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Smithsonian Institution's programs and operations. Our office issued 6 audit reports, completed substantial work on 6 ongoing audits, and closed 16 recommendations. We made recommendations to improve the Smithsonian's programs for privacy, deferred maintenance, information security, and the National Zoo.

Our investigative activities continued to hold accountable those who sought to harm Smithsonian's programs and operations and to prevent and deter fraud, waste, and abuse through an active outreach program. During the reporting period, we resolved 36 complaints and completed 2 investigations. In one case, OIG investigators provided Smithsonian with information that will help to prevent the payment of an estimated \$273,900 in workers compensation benefits due to the incarceration of a former employee.

In the months ahead, the office will continue to focus on issues of importance to the Smithsonian Board and management in meeting their stewardship and fiduciary responsibilities, supporting congressional oversight, and providing information to the public. We hope that you find this report informative.



Cathy L. Helm  
Inspector General

# Introduction

## Smithsonian Institution

The Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) is a trust instrumentality of the United States created by Congress in 1846 to carry out the provisions of the will of James Smithson, an English scientist who left his estate to the United States to found “an establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge.”

The Smithsonian is the largest museum and research complex in the world. It currently includes 19 museums and galleries, the National Zoological Park, 9 research centers, and numerous research programs. These facilities hosted over 26 million visitors in 2015. The Smithsonian is the steward of approximately 138 million objects and specimens, which form the basis of world-renowned research, exhibitions, and public programs in the arts, culture, history, and the sciences.

The Smithsonian’s Affiliations Program brings its collections, scholarship, and exhibitions to 45 states, Puerto Rico, and Panama. During fiscal year 2015, the Smithsonian’s websites reached 116 million visitors, and the collection of digitized records available online exceeded 9 million.

Federal appropriations provide the core support for the Smithsonian’s museum functions, science efforts, and infrastructure. They are supplemented by trust resources, including private donations and grants.



View of the Smithsonian Castle. Image from the National Park Service’s Historic American Buildings Survey. Image credit: Jack E. Boucher.

## Office of the Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended in 1988, created the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as an independent entity within the Smithsonian. The OIG reports directly to the Smithsonian Board of Regents and to the Congress. The OIG's organizational structure is described below.

### Office of Audits

The Office of Audits conducts audits of the Smithsonian's programs and operations to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. The office is guided by an annual audit plan that identifies high-risk areas for review. The Office of Audits also monitors the external audits of the Smithsonian's financial statements and of the Smithsonian's information security practices.

### Office of Investigations

The Office of Investigations pursues allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, gross mismanagement, employee and contractor misconduct, and criminal violations of law that have an impact on the Smithsonian's programs and operations. It refers matters to federal, state, and local prosecutors for action whenever the OIG has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of criminal law. The Office of Investigations also presents to management any administrative misconduct for possible disciplinary action.

### Office of Operations

The Office of Operations provides technical and administrative support to the OIG. It is responsible for OIG administrative matters, such as budgeting, procurement, human resources, information technology, and managing organizational performance.

### Counsel

The Counsel to the Inspector General provides independent legal advice to the Inspector General and OIG staff.

## Audits

During this semiannual period, OIG issued 6 audit reports, completed substantial work on 6 ongoing audits, and closed 16 recommendations. The OIG's audit work focuses on areas to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Smithsonian's programs and operations.

### Summary of Issued Audit Reports

Below are summaries of the six reports that OIG issued during this reporting period.

#### [Fiscal Year 2014 Independent Evaluation of the Smithsonian Institution's Information Security Program \(OIG-A-16-02, December 17, 2015\)](#)

Under a contract overseen by the Office of Audits, CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (CLA) conducted an independent audit of the Smithsonian's information security program for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2014. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) directs the OIG to annually evaluate the information security program of the entity it oversees. The Smithsonian voluntarily complies with FISMA requirements. For fiscal year 2014, the review focused on the general support system, the Web Time & Attendance system (WebTA), the Museum System, the Pan-Institutional Database for Advancement (PANDA), and the Streamlined Applicant Referral System (STARS) hiring management system.

CLA found that the Smithsonian continued to make progress in improving controls over information technology resources. However, the Smithsonian needs to do additional work to ensure controls are in place and operating effectively. The auditors noted some control weaknesses resulting from the Smithsonian not implementing security patches or software updates in a timely manner. They also found that some system managers were not consistently submitting quarterly monitoring reports or remediating security vulnerabilities within established timeframes. Specifically, the auditors determined that the Smithsonian needs to:

- improve its security assessment and authorization process and implement additional controls and plans in key areas,
- implement an information security continuous monitoring strategy,
- improve its plan of action and milestones process,
- conduct or document its continuous monitoring activities for three of five systems tested,
- conduct configuration baseline compliance,
- strengthen access controls management,
- implement multi-factor authentication for remote access, and
- take more action to improve its patch management of identified vulnerabilities.

Further, the Smithsonian needs to continue to focus on fully implementing recommendations from prior years, such as the recommendations to ensure that mobile devices that may be used to store sensitive information are secured with an appropriate



encryption technology, and to monitor workstations for unapproved software and timely maintenance of approved software.

CLA made recommendations to address the conditions noted above. Smithsonian management concurred with the recommendations and proposed corrective actions to address them.

**[Independent Auditors' Report on the Smithsonian Institution's Fiscal Year 2015 Financial Statements \(OIG-A-16-03, January 22, 2016\)](#)**

Under a contract overseen by the Office of Audits, KPMG LLP (KPMG) issued its independent auditors' report on the Smithsonian's statement of financial position, as of September 30, 2015, and the related statements of financial activity and cash flows. KPMG expressed an unmodified opinion on the financial statements indicating that they were presented fairly, in all material respects, with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

**[Independent Auditors' Report on The Smithsonian Institution's Privacy Program \(OIG-A-16-04, March 14, 2016\)](#)**

OIG contracted with an independent public accounting firm, Cotton & Company, to conduct a performance audit to assess the effectiveness of the Smithsonian's privacy program and practices. Cotton & Company found that the Smithsonian has made progress in privacy management since the last OIG privacy audit in May 2009. For example, in 2014 the Smithsonian hired a new Privacy Officer, implemented a new privacy policy, and formed working groups to identify and address privacy issues.

However, Cotton & Company determined that significant work is still needed to institute key privacy processes and controls. For example, key activities that have not been completed include developing an organization-wide privacy strategic plan and documenting a comprehensive list of personally identifiable information being collected, processed, and stored throughout the Smithsonian. Without a clear understanding of the types of personally identifiable information being handled, management officials do not have reasonable assurance that they are collecting only the information needed to carry out the Smithsonian's mission and are adequately protecting that information from unauthorized use or disclosure. Additionally, Cotton & Company noted that the Smithsonian Privacy Office consists of one employee, the Privacy Officer, who supports 6,373 employees, 721 research fellows, and 9,817 volunteers.

To improve the privacy program, Cotton & Company found that:

- the Smithsonian needs a strategic privacy plan,
- the Smithsonian needs to develop a comprehensive inventory of personally identifiable information,
- the Smithsonian's privacy impact assessment process needs improvement,
- the Smithsonian's security awareness and privacy training need improvement,
- the Smithsonian needs to improve physical controls over personally identifiable information, and
- the Smithsonian needs to review and update its privacy policies.

Cotton & Company made recommendations to address the findings listed above. Smithsonian management concurred with the recommendations and has proposed corrective actions to address them.

**Smithsonian Enterprises: Audit of the Effectiveness of the Information Security Program (OIG-A-16-05, March 25, 2016)**

OIG contracted with an independent public accounting firm, Crowe Horwath LLP (Crowe), to conduct an audit to evaluate the effectiveness of the Smithsonian Enterprises (SE) information security program and practices as well as SE's compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). In 1998, the Smithsonian organized its various business activities into a centralized entity known as Smithsonian Enterprises. SE operates a variety of revenue-generating activities, including museum stores, a mail-order gift catalog and websites, three IMAX theaters, magazines, licensing, and media. Crowe completed an information security risk assessment on a sample of servers and network devices across the SE corporate and retail networks, which are a subset of the Smithsonian's corporate network (SInet). Crowe also completed an internal penetration assessment across SInet and the SE corporate and retail environments, testing approximately 5,000 devices (servers, workstations, and printers) for vulnerabilities. In addition, Crowe completed a PCI DSS gap assessment.

Crowe found that improvements are needed to address vulnerabilities in four key areas: (1) identity and access management, (2) configuration management, (3) information stored on unencrypted laptops and backup tapes, and (4) unsupported systems.

- Identity and access management is the security discipline that enables the right individuals to access the right resources at the right times for the right reasons. In its testing, the auditors were able to guess the passwords for some user accounts and to identify multiple accounts that shared the same password. Furthermore, they found that the SE corporate network could be at risk due to systems with weak passwords on the Smithsonian network, SInet.
- Configuration management is a collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of information technology products and information systems. This is accomplished through control of processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems. The auditors found that SE was utilizing insecure communication protocols on its networks. Additionally, a component of the point-of-sale system had a vulnerability that could be used to harvest credit card data, known as skimming.
- Information stored on laptop computers and backup tapes can be vulnerable to breaches in confidentiality and integrity. SE adopted an industry standard in 2014 to encrypt new laptops to prevent unauthorized access. However, the auditors found that only 16 of 104 existing laptops were encrypted because employees were encouraged, not required, to have them encrypted. The auditors also found that backup tapes sent for off-site storage were not encrypted.
- Unsupported systems are those that need to be replaced because support for the systems' components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer. The auditors identified some systems that were using obsolete,

unsupported software. In addition, some servers on the SInet network were running unsupported operating systems, and a network monitoring device was outdated and not receiving updates.

Crowe made recommendations to strengthen password requirements, disable insecure communications protocols, disable an insecure card reader function, encrypt mobile media, and replace or update servers that had unsupported operating systems. Smithsonian management concurred with the findings and said that they have addressed or plan to address all the recommendations.

**[Deferred Maintenance: The Smithsonian Generally Followed Leading Management Practices, but Reducing Its Backlog Remains a Challenge \(OIG-A-16-06, March 30, 2016\)](#)**

Deferred maintenance refers to maintenance and repair activities that were not performed when they should have been. Deferring maintenance can reduce the overall life of facilities and may lead to higher costs in the long run. Deferred maintenance is not unique to the Smithsonian. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified the management of federal real property across the government as a high-risk area, in part because federal budget constraints limit agencies' ability to address deferred maintenance backlogs.

OIG found that, in fiscal year 2014, the Smithsonian fully followed seven of nine leading practices for managing its \$785 million deferred maintenance backlog. GAO identified these nine leading practices for managing federal deferred maintenance backlogs. The Smithsonian followed these practices when, for example, it conducted facility condition assessments to evaluate the condition of its facilities and to calculate the estimated dollar amount of the deferred maintenance backlog, and it established priorities for managing deferred maintenance projects.

The Smithsonian, however, did not follow the leading practice of identifying types of facilities as being either mission critical or mission supportive, and it does not have criteria for doing so. As a result, the Smithsonian may be hindered in efforts to allocate limited resources to the most mission-critical and mission-supportive facilities. Additionally, the Smithsonian only partially followed the leading practice of structuring budgets to identify the funding (1) for maintenance and repair and (2) to address its deferred maintenance backlog. The Smithsonian structures its federal budget justifications to specifically identify the funding allotted for maintenance and repair, which meets the first part of this leading practice. However, the Smithsonian's budget does not have sufficient detail to determine how much the backlog will be reduced by federal spending. Since OIG analysis showed that maintenance spending has little impact on the deferred maintenance backlog, providing additional information on how capital revitalization spending reduces the backlog would help decision makers, including Congress, evaluate the Smithsonian's budget requests.

Smithsonian management has not reduced the backlog of deferred maintenance because it is spending less than the recommended amounts to maintain the condition of its facilities. The National Research Council recommends that government-funded organizations spend between 2 percent and 4 percent of the current replacement value of their facilities on maintenance. The Smithsonian spent approximately 1 percent on maintenance annually between fiscal years 2007 and 2014. The Smithsonian has a

strategy to reduce the size of its deferred maintenance backlog by increasing its federal budget requests for both maintenance and capital revitalization funding. However, this strategy faces challenges due to federal budget constraints.

OIG recommended that the Smithsonian (1) develop criteria for identifying facilities as mission critical or mission supportive and then designate facilities as mission critical or mission supportive, and (2) develop and implement a method to estimate how much planned capital revitalization spending will reduce the deferred maintenance backlog. Management concurred with these recommendations.

**National Zoological Park: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Monitoring of Recommendations to Resolve Animal Care Issues (OIG-A-16-07, March 31, 2016)**

OIG found that the National Zoo had no centrally managed process to monitor recommendations made to improve animal care operations. Because the National Zoo was not centrally monitoring recommendations, OIG had to compile a list of the 51 recommendations from 5 reports issued in 2013 by the National Zoo's Animal Care and Use Committee; the Association of Zoos and Aquariums; the Smithsonian's Office of Safety, Health and Environmental Management; and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The recommendations related to (1) updating policies and procedures, (2) repairing or maintaining animal care facilities or equipment, (3) acquiring additional staff or equipment, and (4) updating and documenting training. OIG then worked with National Zoo staff and management to determine the status of corrective actions for each recommendation.

Based on the analysis of the 51 recommendations, OIG concluded that 7 recommendations had not been addressed as of April 2015. OIG met with National Zoo management to discuss the outstanding recommendations, and by July 2015, five recommendations had been resolved. In March 2016, more than 2 years after they were made, the remaining two recommendations were closed.

A key internal control involves active monitoring of the implementation of recommendations until corrective actions are completed. Although the Smithsonian is not required to follow the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-50, this circular addresses monitoring of recommendations, and it contains steps that management should take to ensure prompt resolution of recommendations, such as maintaining accurate records on the status of recommendations until they are resolved. The National Zoo needs to develop a monitoring process for tracking all animal care recommendations. By implementing a monitoring process, the National Zoo will be in a better position to ensure that timely action is taken to address animal care recommendations identified in the future.

OIG recommended that the Director of the National Zoo develop and implement a monitoring process for all recommendations related to animal care that incorporates the steps outlined in OMB Circular A-50. Management concurred with this recommendation.

## Work in Progress

At the end of the period, OIG had six audits in progress, as described below.

### Smithsonian's Controls over Purchase Orders

OIG auditors are assessing the extent to which the Smithsonian's controls over purchase orders are effective in ensuring compliance with policies and procedures in two areas: (1) sole source purchases, and (2) segregation of duties. The auditors are also reviewing compliance with training requirements related to making purchase orders.

### Fiscal Year 2015 Review of the Smithsonian's Information Security Program

Under a contract overseen by the Office of Audits, CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (CLA) is conducting an independent audit of the Smithsonian's information security program for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2015. Although the Smithsonian is not subject to FISMA because the Smithsonian is not an executive branch agency, the Smithsonian has adopted FISMA through its Technical Standards and Guidelines.

### Emergency Preparedness

OIG auditors are assessing to what extent the Smithsonian has effective emergency preparedness policies and procedures in place to protect life and property and to perform essential functions during circumstances that disrupt normal operations.

### Background Investigations

OIG auditors are assessing the extent to which the Smithsonian has effective controls to ensure that background investigations of credentialed personnel are conducted and adjudicated in accordance with applicable policies, procedures, and laws.

### Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory Grants and Contracts Management Program

OIG auditors are assessing to what extent the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (1) is managing grants and contracts in accordance with established policies and procedures, and (2) has ensured that its policies and procedures conform to leading practices.

### OIG Oversight of Financial Statements Audits

An independent public accounting firm, KPMG, conducts the Smithsonian's annual financial statement audits, which include the Smithsonian-wide financial statements, the federal special-purpose financial statements, and the compliance audit of federal awards based on OMB Circular A-133. An OIG auditor serves as the contracting officer's technical representative for these audits.

## Other Audit Activities

### Status of Recommendations

As shown in Table 2, Smithsonian management made significant progress in implementing the recommendations from audit reports that OIG issued in prior semiannual reporting periods. As a result, OIG closed 16 recommendations during the past 6 months.

**Table 2: Summary of Audit Recommendation Activity during the Semiannual Reporting Period Ending March 31, 2016**

Status of Recommendations	Numbers
Open at the beginning of the period	10
Issued during the period	<u>38</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	<u>48</u>
Closed during the period	<u>16</u>
Open at the end of the period	32

In Table 3, a report on the workers' compensation program recommended that funds be put to better use was issued in 2009. No management decision had been made regarding 2 compensation cases prior to this reporting period or within 6 months of the report's issuance. During this reporting period, management resolved those two cases with a reduction in compensation to two recipients of \$1,250,034 over their expected lifetimes.

**Table 3: Reports Issued with Recommendations that Funds Be Put to Better Use**

Type of Reports	Number of Reports	Funds to Be Put to Better Use
Reports for which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period	1	\$1,677,108
Reports issued during the reporting period	0	\$0
<i>Subtotal</i>	1	\$1,677,108
Reports for which a management decision was made during the reporting period		
• Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management	1	\$1,250,034
• Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management	1	\$427,073
Reports for which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period	1	\$0
Reports for which no management decision was made within 6 months of issuance	1	\$1,677,108

Note: Funds to be put to better use are from the report [Administration of the Workers' Compensation Program](#) (A-07-09, March 24, 2009).

Table 4 on the following page summarizes the open recommendations from prior semiannual periods and the target implementation dates.

**Table 4: Recommendations Made in Previous Semiannual Reporting Periods for Which Corrective Actions Are Not Yet Complete**

Report Title (Report Number, Date)	Number of Recommendations	Summary of Recommendations	Target Completion Date
<i>Smithsonian Institution Information Security Program</i> (A-10-11, 3/15/2011)	1	The Chief Information Officer (CIO) should implement controls to ensure that all Smithsonian-owned laptops and mobile devices that may be used to store sensitive information are secured with an appropriate encryption technology.	4/30/2016
<i>Management Advisory Regarding Portable Computer Encryption</i> (M-13-01, 3/4/2013)	2	The Under Secretary for Finance and Administration, in coordination with the other Under Secretaries, should direct Unit Information Technology staff to (1) determine which laptop computers in their inventory may be used to store sensitive data and, with assistance from the Office of the CIO, configure those computers with whole drive encryption, and (2) identify all laptop computers that will not be configured with encryption.	4/30/2016
<i>Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Evaluation of the Smithsonian's Information Security Program</i> (A-12-08, 6/3/2013)	1	The CIO should monitor Smithsonian workstations for unapproved software and timely maintenance of approved software and enforce the policy to maintain products that are approved.	11/30/2016
<i>Management of the Government Purchase Card Program</i> (A13-04, 3/31/2014)	1	The Director of the Office of Contracting & Personal Property Management should develop and implement a strategic sourcing program that encompasses all procurement methods.	9/30/2016
<i>FY 2013 Evaluation of the Smithsonian's Information Security Program</i> (A-13-10, 7/9/2014)	1	The CIO should develop, document, and implement policies and procedures for detecting and removing unauthorized connections.	5/31/2016

### Peer Review

Government Auditing Standards require audit organizations to (1) establish and maintain a system of quality control that is designed to provide the audit organization with reasonable assurance that the organization and its personnel comply with professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements, and (2) undergo external peer reviews by independent reviewers every 3 years. On August 13, 2014, the Railroad Retirement Board OIG completed the most recent peer review of the office, and the Smithsonian OIG received a peer review rating of pass, the highest rating. During this reporting period, the OIG completed a peer review of the quality control system for audits at the Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General.

## Investigations

At the start of the reporting period, we had 32 open complaints and 10 ongoing investigations. During the reporting period, we received 44 complaints, resolved 36 complaints, and completed 2 investigations. At the end of the reporting period, we had 40 open complaints and 11 ongoing investigations.

### Highlights of Investigative Actions

#### Threat for Disclosing Information to the Inspector General

A Smithsonian employee reported that two employees threatened her and her child in retaliation for disclosing information to the OIG. During the course of the investigation, OIG agents discovered that one of these employees did not disclose a previous conviction, as required by Smithsonian policy. As a result, that employee was terminated. The other employee received a 5-day suspension for violating Smithsonian's policies against workplace violence.

#### Workers Compensation Program Fraud

After enduring a 2009 injury while on duty, a former Smithsonian employee collected benefits of \$3,300 per month from the Office of Workers Compensation Programs. OIG agents learned that this employee was convicted of a felony assault in 2013 and was serving a 15-year prison sentence. As an inmate, the former employee is not entitled to workers compensation benefits. In January 2015, the Smithsonian suspended his benefits due to his failure to submit a required annual form. As a result of the OIG investigation, the Smithsonian learned about the employee's incarceration, which caused the long-term loss of his benefits. OIG estimates \$273,900 in benefits payments were prevented.

### Fraud Awareness Program

OIG investigators continued efforts to reach out to Smithsonian staff and inform them about fraud awareness in Smithsonian programs and operations. During this reporting period, OIG investigators made fraud awareness presentations to more than 380 new employees during their orientations.

Table 5 on the following page contains a statistical summary of OIG's investigative results.



**Table 5: Summary of OIG's Investigative Activities and Results**

Investigations	Amount or Number
<b>Caseload</b>	
Cases pending at beginning of reporting period	10
Cases opened during the reporting period	<u>3</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	13
Cases closed during the reporting period	<u>2</u>
Cases carried forward	11
<b>Referrals for Prosecution</b>	
Pending at the beginning of the period	2
Accepted during the period	<u>0</u>
Pending at the end of the period	2
<b>Successful Prosecutions</b>	
Convictions	
Fines	
Probation	
Confinement	
Monetary Restitutions	
Forfeiture of assets and seized evidence	
<b>Administrative Actions</b>	
Terminations	2
Resignations	
Reprimands or admonishments	
Suspensions	
Monetary loss prevented	\$273,900

## Other OIG Activities

### Legislative and Regulatory Review

In accordance with the Inspector General Act, OIG monitored and reviewed legislative and regulatory proposals for their impact on the Smithsonian's programs and operations. Additionally, the Counsel to the Inspector General, working with counsels from other federal Inspector General offices, monitored congressional bills and issues relating to the Inspector General community. OIG also reviewed draft Smithsonian directives that establish policies and procedures affecting the OIG and the Smithsonian's programs and operations.

### Other Activities

OIG remained actively involved with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), a council of federal Inspectors General that promotes collaboration on integrity, economy, and efficiency issues that transcend individual agencies. The Inspector General, Assistant Inspectors General, or staff regularly participated in monthly and other CIGIE meetings. In addition, OIG staff participated in the Washington Metro Electronic Crimes Task Force, the Metropolitan Area Fraud Task Force, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the Security Association of Financial

Institutions workgroup, the TeamMate Federal Users Group, and the Interagency Fraud Risk Data Mining Group.





Smithsonian Institution  
Office of the Inspector General

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The Office of the Inspector General investigates allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, gross mismanagement, employee and contractor misconduct, and criminal and civil violations of law that have an impact on the Smithsonian's programs and operations.

If requested, anonymity is assured to the extent permitted by law. Although you may remain anonymous, we encourage you to provide us with your contact information. The ability to gather additional information from you may be the key to effectively pursuing your allegation.

Information provided is confidential.